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INEFFICIENCY OF RUMANIAN COAL INDUSTRY AND PLANS FOR THE FUTURE

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Review of Progress

Two nationalized enterprises were established in the RPR (Rumanian People's Republic) in 1949 to organize and operate the coal industry. Sovromcarbune (Soviet-Rumanian Coal Combine) was established to develop production in the Jiul Valley, in Anina, and other areas. Another group of about fifteen nationalized coal regions were consolidated under a state enterprise, Carbonifera (Coal Enterprise), later placed under the General Directorate of Coal. Soviet members of the managerial staffs introduced advanced mining techniques and new equipment.

Recently, all coal mining became an integral part of the nationalized economy, thus opening vast opportunities for the exploitation of domestic coal reserves.

During the last few years, the coal industry has acquired much specialized mining equipment. The Soviet Union has shipped to the RPR many extracting machines, trolleys, scraper-conveyors, loading machines, electric antifiredamp motors, compressors, pumps, boring machines, hydraulic drills and hammers, electric drills, mining lamps, conveyor cables, etc.

At the same time, the metal industry manufactured compressors, motors, locomotives and cars for surface transportation, thousands of metal coal cars for use within the mine, and miscellaneous equipment. For the first time, boring machines, hydraulic drills and hammers, and scraper-conveyors were manufactured in the RPR. Some of the equipment produced by the metallurgical industry was mechanically defective, but achievements of the industry as a whole were great.

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The specialized equipment has made it possible to mechanize operations in those mines where work was previously done by hand, and to increase mechanization in developed areas such as the Jiul Valley. Diesel engines have greatly facilitated subterranean transportation at the Filipesti de Padure, Soroceni, and Codlea mines.

Explorations of the extent of coal reserves has increased substantially. Large investments have been made in galleries, pits, and inclined shafts to open larger reserves.

Two important installations for the dehydration of lignite were built during 1948 and 1949 at Filipesti de Padure and at Derna-Voevozi, each with a production capacity of 180,000 tons of dehydrated lignite per year. These installations will be completed and opened in 1951. Many mines were supplied with new rails and enlarged electric powerhouses. Connections with regional electric power cables were also made.

More modern methods of coal mining have been adopted. Thus, at Schitu-Golesti and Filipesti de Padure, several drifts have been constructed in which work is performed at the face with coal-cutting machines equipped with bits adjusted to the resistance of lignite strata. Transportation of the lignite is expedited by the use of loading machines. The increased yield thus obtained has invalidated the theory that coal-cutting machines cannot be used in lignite mining. At the Soroceni mine, where only nonmechanized drifts existed before the mine faces were mechanized, the yield has increased 100 percent. At the same time, drifts 50 meters long (instead of the traditional 15-20 meters) are being constructed.

In the Jiul Valley, the rooms were equipped with metal props and metal shields, thus increasing their yield. Good results were obtained in these mines by using L-shaped belt conveyor systems for the loading process. During 1950, the same methods were successful in several lignite mines. At the Capeni mine roof caving, which assured only a 40-50 percent yield of lignite, was replaced by efficient cutting of horizontal slices.

During 1949 and 1950, standards were set for mining the main types of coal. This will bring a more rational utilization of this fuel.

During 1950, leading miners of various coal mines were organized into technical teams. These special teams performed mining operations more than twice as fast as the regular teams.

To improve mining techniques, competitions were organized among workers. Thus, a "leaders' team" from the Jiul Valley competed at Filipesti de Padure with a local team, and won the contest by exceeding the standard by 50 percent in digging and by 85 percent in cutting. The same team, working at Berevoesti, exceeded the standard by 70.1 percent, as compared with the 71.7 percent realized by the local team.

During 1950, more than 40 percent of the wage earners in the coal industry were engaged in individual competition or in team competition. Concurrently, collective work has expanded considerably, amounting during the last 3 months of 1950, to 51 percent of the total working hours of individual workers.

The decision of the Council of Ministers on the improvement of wages and living conditions for workers in coal mines became effective during the last quarter of 1950. This decision provides important benefits for miners, including higher pay for those who exceed their quota; rewards based on length of service; special advantages designed to improve their standards of living, such as exemption from school taxes for their children, free uniforms, shoes and

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

scholarships for students attending schools and institutes for coal studies; improvements of the system of retirement benefits for miners; and measures for supplying more efficiently the various mining centers with foodstuffs and other products. The title of "leading miner", which entitles its holder to a quarterly reward of 10,000 lei, has been established.

To emphasize the importance attached by the party and government to the work of the miners, the decision provides that the first Sunday following 6 August, the anniversary of the Lupeni strike, will be declared a national holiday to be known as "Miners' Day".

As a result of the new pay system for miners, many "leading miners" from a number of coal mines have earned more than 30,000 lei monthly and, in some cases, as much as 40,000, during the last months of 1950.

During 1949 and 1950, construction of homes for miners in mining regions cost the government more than 450 million lei. At the same time, many buildings of social significance such as bathhouses, canteens, meeting houses, and schools have been or are being constructed.

Mining schools, offering courses at all levels, are graduating more people. In 1948, production exceeded that of 1943, previously the highest level ever attained. In 1949, the production attained a level of 120 percent and in 1950, 132 percent, compared to the 1948 level. At the same time, the cost of coal declined every year.

Planned Coal Production

The Five-Year Plan (1951-1955) of the RPR provides for the gradual increase of coal production to 8,933,000 tons in 1955. This figure, which does not include the production of mines operated by the local people's committees, represents an increase of 223 percent over the production for 1950.

The production rate is particularly intensive in the output of lignite where totals for 1955 are expected to be 217 times as large as those of 1950. This is also true in the case of dried lignite where the output is expected to be increased by 530 percent. The construction of thermal electric plants at Doicesti, Filipesti, Valisoara, and Sarmasag, during the first Five-Year Plan, and at Capeni and Carbunesti, during the second, will make possible the conversion of most of the lignite, regardless of quality, into electric power in the vicinity of the mines from which it was extracted. At the same time, large quantities of crude lignite will be dehydrated at the stations of Filipesti, Derna-Voevozi, and Schitu-Golesti. The resulting product will be a fuel of good quality, resistance, and caloric power.

In 1955, the production of brown coal will be more than twice that of 1950. It will represent two thirds of the total coal production for that year and will be used primarily as a fuel for railroad engines and for industry. By 1955, the Jiul Valley region will produce more than one million tons of specially treated brown coal, with an ash content of 8 percent. This coal will be used for manufacturing metallurgical coke at the special factory to be erected at Hunedoara. Over one million tons of brown coal of inferior quality will be transformed into electric power by the thermal electric plants located in the Jiul Valley, and at Comanesti, Aghires, Arad, and other localities.

Coking coal extracted from the mines of Anina, Doman, and Secul will be transformed into coke at Resita, while the bituminous coal obtained from Cozla-Bigar and Baia-Noua will be transformed into electric power by the thermal electric plant of Ovidiu, on the Danube-Black Sea Canal. The Five-Year Plan also provides for an increase in the production of anthracite.



In 1955, enough coal will be produced to meet the needs of industry, electrification, and transportation; it will also be available in sufficient quantities for use as a fuel in the home.

During the Five-Year Plan, 25.9 billion lei will be invested in our coal industry. New mines will be opened and several mines in the Jiul Valley and in the Banat will be reopened. The production capacity of the other mines will be continuously increased.

The rapid increases anticipated in coal production are closely connected with continuous technical progress in mining operations and especially with the mechanizaton of mining equipment. At the same time, the miner's standard of living will have to be continuously improved.

Although the coal production of 1950 exceeded that of 1949, nevertheless, it did not meet the quota set for the second year of our plan. In order to fulfill the requirements established by the Five-Year Plan, it will be necessary to correct certain deficiencies which were observed in 1949 and 1950. The working capacities of each miner, team, and section, and of the coal industry as a whole, will have to be raised to the level prescribed by our Five-Year Plan.

Deficiencies in Launching the Plan

The first step in the realization of the Five-Year Plan is its launching, i.e., its division into sections and the implementation of each section. According to the program established for launching the Five-Year Plan and the plan for the year 1951, the division and implementation were to be performed for each mine by the central management of the respective mining region and then handed over to the management of the individual mine. The plan for each mine was to be further subdivided for each section, team, and individual miner. Detailed information on assignment of production quotas, on the technical plan, on the division of labor, on the plan for lowering production costs, on the investment plan, and on the supply plan was to be given to every section, team, and miner.

The plan for the coal industry was first to be explained at meetings attended by the managers of the mines, the secretary of the party and the president of the trade union, then at larger meetings attended by section chiefs and production leaders, and finally at meetings of sections and teams. The purpose of these meetings was to acquaint every person engaged in the mining industry with his daily, weekly, monthly, and yearly obligations for the successful fulfillment of the Five-Year Plan.

In many places, however, the meetings were not adequately conducted. In the large majority of mines, presentation of the plan was limited to an explanation of the miner's obligations in terms of fulfillment of his production quota. To this day, most miners do not know what their obligations are in terms of improving mining techniques or reducing production costs and investments.

Failure to give the miners all the required information can be ascribed to the fact that the information was not handed down by the management to the sections, teams, and individual miners.

Many directors and chief mining engineers share the mistaken opinion that the miners should know only the extent of their production quotas and not the other aspects of the plan, which they consider to be too complex to be fully divided and implemented, and which should therefore be known only by a small group of specialists entrusted with the management of the mine. Thus, problems related to the reduction in production costs are seldom known outside the accounting department. This leads to the situation common in all mines that not only



miners but also a large number of technicians have only a vague acquaintance with such important subjects as productivity of labor, index of mechanization, production costs, investment, etc. For this reason, in a number of mines no just correlation has been established between the growth of over-all production and the salary fund, or between increased productivity of labor and the average salary. The miners' insufficient understanding of their responsibilities weakens the mass appeal of the Five-Year Plan. It is obvious that now, when the country is faced with the realization of the first Five-Year Plan, following 2 years of planned economy, this situation is no longer tolerable.

The struggle for perfecting the technical and financial aspects of industrial planning, for exact distribution of duties and responsibilities among each unit and individual, for the most detailed explanation of every worker's individual obligations, and for the integration of individual achievements must be the principal concern of planning sections and services, as well as of directors, chief engineers, and chief accountants in the coal industry.

Long-Range Projects

To meet the production goals set by the Five-Year Plan, it will be necessary to open new coal deposits. This will, in turn, necessitate increasingly higher investments in the mining industry, i.e., in development and long-range mining operations such as excavations, digging pits, galleries, and drifts.

The Five-Year Plan provides that 4.8 billion lei (approximately seven times the amount for the year 1950) be invested in the mining industry for long-range projects.

Concurrently, the coal industry will have to improve its present knowledge concerning the extent of coal reserves and of coal deposits available in mining regions. The extent of present geological explorations is definitely inadequate for new production plans and constitutes a serious impediment to the realization of the anticipated coal production.

Several long-range projects were carried out successfully in the mining industry during the last few years. Nevertheless, they failed to fulfill the needs of production. Only 80 percent of the scheduled projects were fulfilled during 1950. New digging operations especially were neglected. None of the eight diggings scheduled for the Comanesti region were completed, thus directly affecting the successful development of production at this mine. Work on the new lignite mine in the Caransebes region, which will supply fuel for the projected electric power plant at Valisoara, is running behind schedule.

The technical plan for 1950 directed that special studies be undertaken by every mine to determine maximum exploration, digging, and exploring within each mine.

In none of the mines under the General Directorate of Coal were new methods developed which would lead to the correct solution of this very important problem. Many mines have not yet adopted a definite and well-coordinated plan for the execution of long-range projects, and some have not even worked out a plan for the general development of the mine. This state of affairs is the result of the low technical level prevailing in these mines and especially of the lack of initiative on the part of technicians and engineers.

These facts prove that it will be necessary to carry out long-range projects with the utmost care, both quantitatively and qualitatively, since they constitute the basis of mining operations.



It will be necessary to eliminate all shortcomings in the supply of mining equipment and to use effectively the equipment now available, in order to obtain the maximum efficiency in exploitation.

The opening of new pits and galleries, and other mining operations must be accelerated by adopting modern Soviet working techniques, by improving the quality of the workers, and by mechanizing mining operations. Long-range projects must be carefully organized so as to avoid the repeated transfer of workers from construction to production work and vice versa.

Daily records should be kept on the progress of all long-range projects and on the opening of new mines and coal deposits.

The goals set by the present Five-Year Plan and the one which will immediately follow it will be fulfilled, and even exceeded, if the proper ratio between production and available coal deposits is observed.

Mechanization of Operations

The key to increased coal production during the Five-Year Plan will be the improvement of the technical level of mining operations and especially the mechanization of underground operations. The plan calls for extensive supplying of the coal industry with the necessary mining and transportation equipment, for the acquisition of which 6.5 billion lei will be spent. The mechanization of development and exploitation operations will be characterized, first, by replacement of the mattock and hand-drill with hydraulic and electric drills, and, next, by more extensive use of coal-cutting machines.

For the mechanization of transportation from faces, the coal industry is scheduled to receive, during the Five-Year Plan, several hundred scraper-conveyors and loading machines, while for underground transportation, dozens of extracting machines and locomotives, and hundreds of winches and coal cars will be supplied. Surface loading and unloading operations will also be mechanized.

According to the technical plan, the percentage of mechanization is expected to show the following increases for Sovromcarbune: cutting, from 93 percent in 1950 to 97 percent in 1955; transportation from faces, from 62 to 79 percent; underground transportation, from 80 to 84 percent; transportation to surface, from 96 to 97 percent. For the General Directorate of Coal, the increases for this period will be: mechanization in drifts, from 5 percent in 1950 to 37 percent in 1955; transportation from face, from 20 to 72 percent; underground transportation, from 40 to 80 percent; transportation to surface, from 92 to 98 percent.

It will be observed from a study of these statistics that almost 100 percent mechanization will be attained in mines under Sovromcarbune (especially in Jiul Valley) and substantial increase will be achieved in the backward mines under the General Directorate of Coal.

The mechanization of labor in coal mining, although to a large extent dependent on the equipment-manufacturing industries, is, nevertheless, the primary responsibility of the coal industry itself. Much valuable experience in the acquisition and use of equipment was gained in carrying out the 1950 plan.

The plan for investment in equipment was fulfilled 78 percent. However, late deliveries and delivery of defective equipment prevented some equipment from being used in the fulfillment of the tasks set by the plan for 1950.



The machine industry achieved important successes in supplying the coal industry with equipment previously imported from abroad. Large-scale manufacturing of hydraulic hammers and drills (at the Cugir Works), scraper-conveyors (at the Semanatoarea Works), compressors, fans, and other mining equipment has been undertaken for the first time.

Despite these successes, several shortcomings were noticed in the manufacture of mining equipment which should be promptly corrected. The metal industry did not attach sufficient importance to the requests of the coal industry and assigned the manufacturing of mining equipment to plants which lacked the necessary manpower and machinery for this purpose. The mining industry was, in turn, guilty of negligence in waiting until the very last moment to order equipment, obviously not taking into account the planning problems of the machine industry. The nature of the desired equipment was seldom specified in advance and frequent changes in orders further complicated the manufacturing process.

At the same time, cooperation between specialists in the coal and metal industries left much to be desired.

For example, the hydraulic hammers and drills manufactured in large quantities for the first time at the Cugir Works in 1949 were defective. This demonstrates a lack of cooperation between technicians in the two industries, for, during the last few years, the machine industry has categorically demonstrated its capacity to manufacture in large quantities boring machines, tractors, compressors, lathes, and other equipment more complex than hydraulic hammers or drills.

Specialists in the coal industry, instead of cooperating, merely rejected all defective equipment upon delivery. Similarly, certain scraper-conveyors manufactured on a large scale for the first time at the Semanatoarea Works, could not be used because of construction defects and because of failure to place early orders for antifiredamp motors, which must be imported. Similarly, IMB (Metallurgic Enterprise of the Banat), which supplies specialized equipment to the mining industry, has not paid sufficient attention to the quality of the products delivered.

Similar examples are fairly numerous. The true causes of deficiencies in supplying equipment are not the so-called "objective reasons" but organizational defects, which only too frequently closely related to the lack of personal responsibility and the improper political education of certain employees.

During the last few years, deficiencies of supply were further aggravated in certain instances by improper administration and utilization of existing mining equipment.

Dozens of metal coal cars of 600-millimeter gauge were idle at the Sotanga and Berevoesti mines while production at these mines was halted because of the absence of coal cars of 500-millimeter gauge. Similarly, dozens of electric drills were idle at the mines in the Jiul Valley, Filipesti de Padure, Comanesti, Sotanga, Berevoesti, and elsewhere because no electric transformers were available. Equipment was stored in the warehouses of many mines instead of being used for mining operations. Thus, at Sotanga, two powerful water pumps were idle, which could have been used at Berevoesti where water was removed from the mine by coal car. Ignorance of the quantity of mining equipment available and of its proper use have been responsible for its improper distribution and use in many coal mines.

The need for mechanizing mining makes absolutely necessary the prompt correction of deficiencies in the supply and use of mining equipment. In the interest of the mining industry itself and of the national industry in general,



it is necessary to combat the negligence of leaders and technicians in the mining industry who refuse to adopt proper political orientation and who do not understand their obligation to support the growing machine industry.

It will be necessary to eradicate the skeptical attitude of certain technicians toward the use of the new equipment, seemingly difficult to use but which actually greatly facilitates mining operations. It will be necessary to combat the local "patriotism" of certain mines that hoard equipment which they do not actually need.

The entire supply organization will have to be established on a firm basis. It will be necessary to stimulate the initiative, spirit of enterprise, and responsibility of all concerned, and this must be accomplished by raising their professional level and by sharpening their political vigilance so that any attempts by the class enemy to stop mining production by sabotaging the supply process may be promptly suppressed.

The problem of mechanizing mining operations must be the main concern of the coal industry in its struggle to fulfill and exceed the requirements set by the plan. It will be necessary to expand the mechanization process by acquiring not only the type of equipment presently used, but, following the example of the Soviet coal industry, more specialized and advanced equipment such as combines and other improved machinery.

Industrial Construction

The Five-Year Plan allots 3.8 billion lei for industrial construction in the coal industry. The capacity of the coal-processing plants at the Lupeni and Petrila mines will be expanded to cope with the increased production and to allow the processing of the special coal used for making coke. A special plant will be constructed for the manufacture of semicoke. Industrial construction required by the increasing needs of production, such as coal-storage depots, railroads, electrical installations, electric cables, miscellaneous workshops, etc., will be built at every mine.

The experience of the past few years, especially that of 1950, has revealed the weaknesses of the coal industry in the fields of construction in general and of industrial construction in particular.

The 1950 plan for industrial construction was realized only 73 percent, primarily because of delays in setting up construction projects and getting the necessary construction materials, but also because organizational deficiencies in the construction and coal enterprises.

The construction of the two dehydrating stations for lignite at Filipesti de Padure and Derna-Voevozi was especially slow. Although work was begun in 1948 for a scheduled opening in 1949, the installations will not be ready for use before the first half of 1951 because of long delays in setting up the construction projects and in getting the necessary construction materials.

In the future, since the Five-Year Plan specifically indicates the number and type of construction projects to be executed every year, it will be possible to schedule the projects so as to eliminate the delays still prevailing in this field in 1951.

Technicians responsible for the production of coal have not paid proper attention to the problem of qualitative improvement of the coal produced. Hence, it will be necessary to stimulate their interest by encouraging them to undertake scientific research and to draw up such construction projects as may be of interest to the coal industry.

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Improved Mining Methods

To increase the productivity of labor during the Five-Year Plan, it will be necessary to improve mining methods. The technical plan prescribes studies and practical experiments for determining the most rational methods for developing and exploiting each lignite deposit. By way of concrete steps, it prescribes more extensive use of coal-cutting machines for development work, of metal props within the mines, and of conveyor belts in transportation from the mines of the Jiul Valley. It also prescribes: the construction of new faces or the expansion of existing falls which are using coal-cutting machines and metal props at the Schitu-Golesit, Doicesti, Filipesti de Padure, and Sarmasag mines; initial construction of long faces similarly equipped at Soroceni; and, finally, initial construction of faces at Lupac.

The mining methods used in the past at most lignite mines have been gradually improved during the last few years. A decisive step in this direction was taken in 1950 when mechanization was successfully introduced in lignite mines.

Nevertheless, these achievements have not been sufficiently popularized and, consequently, old techniques and lack of interest in new methods are still prevalent in a number of mines.

During the Five-Year Plan, the coal industry must try to spread the use of new mining methods and advanced Soviet methods, which guarantee improved labor productivity and better working conditions in mines. Plans for experiments on underground gasification of lignite must be fulfilled. Special attention must be paid to suggestions for new or improved techniques. For more efficient production, it is essential to popularize and adopt as many of these suggestions as possible.

An important responsibility of the coal industry is the improvement of the quality and distribution of extracted coal. In the past, despite shortages of fuel, large quantities of coal were left in the storage depots of several mines because of its poor quality. It is the duty of the mines to adopt more efficient methods of extracting and handling the coal. For example, it will be necessary in the mines, to eliminate the excessive use of explosives not only because of the waste of explosives but also because this practice increases the percentage of dust and other waste matter in the coal. It is also necessary to transport the coal directly to the storage depot in order to avoid excessive and unnecessary handling.

Training Workers

The Five-Year Plan attaches much importance to the training of workers and technicians in the coal industry. According to the plan, during the 5 years of its existence, more than 26,000 workers in the coal industry will become better qualified in their own fields or will become qualified for other positions. Many of these will be nonspecialists. Professional schools in the coal industry will graduate more than 1,800 students, technical high schools about 1,500, and superior technical schools about 750.

For the improvement of training in this field, the plan provides for spending 1.1 billion lei. Construction of the Coal Institute at Petrosani and of the professional schools at Lupeni and Comanesti will be completed. Provisions are also made for construction of a technical college and a professional school.

During 1950, much progress was made by coal-mining schools on all levels; nevertheless, they were unable to remedy certain shortcomings which lessened the value of the results obtained.



At schools designed to raise the qualification of miners in categories II-VI, the number of graduating students in 1950 exceeded 3,300, a figure which was higher than that anticipated by the plan. Attendance, however, was irregular, especially at the mines under the General Directorate of Coal where the rapid turnover in the labor force and poor administrative practices resulted in less than 60 percent of the miners attending classes regularly. Neither the location of the schools nor the schedule of classes was arranged to suit the convenience of the miners. No attempt was made to establish shifts in the schools so as to give every miner an opportunity to attend classes regularly. The importance of qualifications has been insufficiently popularized. Many of the teachers, recruited from among engineers and technicians of the various mines, did not organize their courses well. These were frequently too difficult and contained too much extraneous material at the expense of essential information. Seminars were held too infrequently and the progress of the students was insufficiently ascertained. No attempt was made to let students specialize in their field of interest.

Similar organizational deficiencies were observed to a lesser degree in the professional schools, technical high schools, and advanced technical schools. Especially unfortunate was the lack of enough teachers and adequate textbooks to meet the increasingly higher level of achievement by a correspondingly higher number of students.

The coal industry should realize that the proper training of miners is of equal importance with the fulfillment of the production plan. since increases in production are dependent on the availability of well-qualified workers.

Since the future students of higher technical schools will be selected from among the members of the working classes who are presently attending schools of a lower level, it is imperative to correct all the deficiencies indicated above in the shortest possible time.

Organization of Labor

The success of the Five-Year Plan in the coal industry will depend, to a large extent, on the organization of labor throughout the industry. Neither mechanization nor the adoption of advanced methods of production can compensate for defective organization. On the contrary, improvements on the technical level of mining and the concurrent increase in the productivity of labor and income of the miners are closely connected with the superior organization of labor.

During 1950, the established norms were exceeded, on the average, by 17 percent. Nevertheless, the fact that several teams did not meet their production quotas proves that deficiencies exist in the organization of labor. It shows, in the first place, that the miners' work was inadequately supported by the responsible technical and administrative organs of the respective mines. It also shows that certain trade unions failed to instill the spirit of socialist competition among the workers.

Relations between technical personnel and the miners were generally poor. Many technicians spent too much time at their desks neglecting the work in the mines. Inadequate efforts were made to fill all the shortages of necessary tools and equipment on time, to properly staff mining teams and equitable distribute assignments and burdens among them, and to supervise closely the achievements of every team so as to help the miners overcome the difficulties encountered in their work.



The failure to organize properly the daily production work, combined with the low professional caliber of a large number of workers who had only recently joined the coal industry, caused a number of mining teams to fall below minimum norms during 1950.

The huge available working potential which, if properly utilized, would raise the productivity of the ordinary mining team to that of a "leader team", has been insufficiently explored. Thus, in many mines, teams are still in the assembly hall when their actual work in the mines should have begun, thus failing to work the required 8 hours per day.

The procedure established by "mining leaders" at certain mines in the Jiul Valley, by which the replacement team automatically takes over the work of the outgoing team, has fully demonstrated its effectiveness in assuring higher productivity of labor and higher earnings for the miners. Not even in the Jiul Valley, however, has this procedure been generally adopted. This automatic-replacement procedure has been a great working incentive for the miners. Popa Ludovic, a leader in the Jiul Valley, having first convinced himself from personal experience of the effectiveness of this system, introduced it at the Sotanga mine when he became director. On the other hand, at several mines (Derna-Tatarus, Sarmasag, Comanesti, etc.) no attempt was made to introduce the automatic replacement system during 1950.

Lack of organization caused many qualified miners to leave the coal industry and join one which assured them of a higher income as, for instance, the construction industry. This fluctuation has in turn been responsible for difficulties in organizing mining teams, meeting standards, organizing qualification courses, etc.

Many mines have adopted the system of making up accumulated deficits in their monthly and quarterly production quotas by rush work at the end of the period, only to have production lapse again at the beginning of the next period. All this is reflected in periodical oscillations in production. This procedure forced periodic shifting of workers from construction to production work and vice versa, thus weakening the organization of labor.

One reason for the lack of proper organization was the impossibility of establishing harmonious cooperation between mining technicians and engineers, and the mass of the workers, in all instances.

The lack of a sufficient number of trained technicians has forced the coal industry to employ many elements imbued with a petty bourgeois, bureaucratic, or even reactionary spirit, who refuse to adjust themselves to the new organization of labor as created by our regime of popular democracy. Last year, at the Derna-Tatarus mines, for example, the absence of any contact between certain technicians and the working masses was responsible for serious deficiences in the organization of labor. To a greater or lesser degree, the same deficiencies prevailed in many other coal mines.

Deficiencies were also observed in the relations among various sections of the mines, and in the functioning of auxiliary services, especially those entrusted with maintenance and supply of materials.

In order to accomplish successfullly the tasks set by the Five-Year Plan, it will be necessary to correct promptly all deficiencies in the organization of labor, especially those in subterranean work.

It will be necessary to liquidate all inimical and bureaucratic elements who refuse to adapt themselves to the new conditions. On the other hand, encouragement and support must be given to engineers and technicians of the old school who are willing to perform their duties loyally. Young technicians and

engineers must be helped to acquire a knowledge of their specialities in preparation for the struggle to raise the technical level of mining operations and to organize the labor force in the most effective manner. Labor organizations, and in particular the trade union and the UTM organizations (Union of Working Youth), will have to join the managements of the mines in the struggle to prevent any mining team from falling behind in its production quota. It will be necessary to combat all unnecessary absence from work of the semiproletarian classes by explaining repeatedly the importance of their contribution. The lack of discipline of certain bourgeois and kulak elements who have surreptitiously joined the ranks of the miners in several enterprises will have to be eliminated as dangerous to the interests of the working classes. To improve working conditions and coal production, it will be necessary to foster the spirit of socialist competition in all coal mines by popularizing the achievements of the teams of mining leaders and by introducing the advanced Soviet Stakhanovite methods.

Miners' Standard of Living

At the same time, it will be necessary to assure the continuous improvement of the miners' standards of living. The principal concern should be to build new houses for the miners and repair existing ones. The Five-Year Plan allots 3.9 billion lei for social and cultural construction, of these 3.3 billion will be invested in workers' housing. To accomplish this task, it will be necessary to eliminate the delays in planning and organization which have prevented the on-schedule completion of the social and cultural and industrial construction planned for 1950. Particular attention will have to be devoted to the planning of buildings, so that the new houses will most comfortably and efficiently accommodate the largest possible number of miners and their families. It is essential to complete on schedule the construction of all buildings of social significance, as provided by the Five-Year Plan, such as bathhouses, clinics, canteens, and schools. It is also essential to assure maximum development of cultural and sporting activities among workers in the coal industry while concurrently improving their standard of living.

Conclusion

The Five-Year Plan anticipates a 60-percent increase in the productivity of labor throughout the coal industry as a result of the mechanization of labor in coal mines, the adoption of advanced mining techniques, the more rational organization of labor, and the improvement of the miners' working and living conditions. At the same time, the cost of coal will decrease 22 percent as a result of higher productivity of labor, reductions in the consumption of certain materials, rationalization of mining methods, and an over-all reduction of expenses.

One of the most important roles in the realization of the tasks of the Five-Year Plan is entrusted to the mines' administrative personnel. The managers of the mines, who, during the last few years, have been appointed from among leading workers with a high degree of political consciousness, have greatly contributed to the rapid progress of the industry by their effective methods of combating shortages and organizing labor in their respective mines. Nevertheless, many do not yet fully understand the complexity of their duties as sole managers of the mines under a socialist economy. In several coal mines during 1950, the correlation of work and wages, which requires that the value of the over-all production increase more rapidly than the salary fund and that the productivity of labor increase more rapidly than the average salary, has not been performed on a quarterly basis as required by our system of economic planning.

Similarly, systematic reduction of production costs per mine was not achieved because no detailed analysis of the variation of the individual components of the total production cost was performed, nor was full use made of the means available to assure the reduction.

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Control of the achievements of the plan was generally defective, and consequently, the monthly achievement reports of the mines were incomplete and filled with errors.

The slowdowns in the coal industry, which, during 1950, accomplished only 95 percent of its plan, can and must be corrected by firmly eliminating the mistakes and shortcomings responsible for this situation.

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